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The prospect of a military offensive against Iraq puts more than the price of oil into
motion. It also causes further-reaching speculations on the extent to which Iraqi oil
reserves and production capacities might serve as a motivation for the United States to
intervene in Iraq. When Iraqs Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, accuses the U.S. that its real
interests lie in seeking to destroy Iraq in order to control the Middle East oil, he is
making an accusation that resonates in many commentaries from both Western and
non-Western sources. Washington, in turn, strictly denies that oil represents a motive
for threatening military intervention in Iraq. It does not deny, however, that such an
intervention would have repercussions on international oil markets.
These repercussions could take on drastic
dimensions. After all, 63 per cent of the
worlds proven oil reserves lie in five
Persian Gulf states  Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iran.
Iraqs share of international oil reserves
(approximately 11 per cent) is second only
to Saudi Arabia (25 per cent). Nevertheless,
while Iraq must be regarded as a heavy-
weight in the oil business due to the extent
of its reserves, its significance in supplying
oil to world markets has diminished. To be
sure, Iraqi oil production rose considerably
after the Persian Gulf War ended in 1991,
from 0.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to
2.6 mbd in 2000. But the Iraqi oil industrys
state of disrepair (lack of spare parts)
caused exports to shrink from 2.1 mbd in
2000 to 1.7 mbd in 2001. Despite the fact
that the UNs Oil-for-Food Program would
permit the export of approximately
2.2 mbd, Iraqi oil export averaged only
1.18 mbd during the first eight months of
2002. Added to this are illegal exports,
which are estimated at up to 0.3 mbd;
revenues from this source are used
primarily for arms purchases. While Iraqs
share of world oil production stood at 5 per
cent in the 1980s, this figure has now
declined to approximately 2.5 per cent
(current world production: ca. 76 mbd).
Iraqs production volume comprises only
about 25 per cent that of Saudi Arabia
(which currently produces approximately
7.6 mbd). Iraqs share of the 25.5 mbd
produced by the 11 OPEC states is 7 per
cent. Saudi Arabias excess capacity, i.e., its
ability to increase production within a
short period of time, is alone estimated at
3.5 mbd  more than twice the volume of
Iraqi oil exports. A discontinuation in oil
supplies from Iraq could therefore be com-
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pensated without problem  provided that
Saudi Arabia is willing to assume the role of
swing supplier, as it has done so often
during the past three decades. Russia, for
example (in contrast to insinuations by
President Putin), would not be able to
increase its production by even 1 mbd. No
country outside the Persian Gulf region
possesses excess capacity of this magnitude.
Iraq claims that it is capable of developing
a production capacity of up to 10 mbd, but
even with massive foreign investment in
production and transport, it would take
five years for Iraq to regain a capacity of
just 4 mbd.
The Situation of Oil Reserves
While Iraq currently plays a relatively
marginal role in global oil markets, this is
not the case with regard to oil reserves and
thus Iraqs potential long-term significance
for international oil supplies. Proven
reserves of conventional oil worldwide
are estimated at 1,050 billion barrels (bb).
With 112.5 bb, Iraq possesses approxi-
mately 11 per cent of these reserves. Iraqs
share of oil reserves might be even higher if
potential reserves are included. In economic
terms, the development of unconventional
reserves can only be profitable at oil prices
that are considerably higher than current
prices. In contrast, Iraqs oil can be devel-
oped at particularly low cost. As long as
OPEC maintains the price of oil approxi-
mately within its self-defined target range
(between $22-28), it will be impossible to
produce unconventional forms of oil (e.g.,
oil shale, oil sands, etc.) in an economically
viable manner.
The above-mentioned five Persian Gulf
states that possess 63 per cent of the
worlds proven oil reserves provide only
26 per cent of current world oil production.
This means that their oil reserves are being
depleted only gradually. The statistical life-
time of these states reserves  i.e., the ratio
of oil reserves to current annual pro-
duction, or R/P ratio  now stands at 87
years. The corresponding R/P ratios for
Russia, Europe, and North America are 19,
10, and 8 years respectively. Because these
five Persian Gulf states command the
largest potential reserves, and because they
can develop their oil at far below average
cost, their ability to (re)gain significant
shares of global oil markets will remain
considerable. Iraqs claim that it can
increase its current production of 2 mbd
to 10 mbd in the future should not be
regarded as unfounded in terms of either
reserves or costs. In the long term, Iraq
could become a serious competitor to Saudi
Arabia. However, this increase in produc-
tion would require tens of billions of
dollars in foreign investment (which, under
attractive investment conditions, would
certainly be profitable), and production
quotas within OPEC would have to be
redistributed accordingly. In order to avoid
drastic imbalances within OPEC, this latter
shift could occur at best over a period of ten
years, provided an increased global demand
for oil. It is also conceivable that a U.S.-con-
trolled or independent Iraq might with-
draw from OPEC production limits. A cor-
responding drastic increase in production
would then cause global market prices to
decline.
Developments in Oil Prices
The price of oil is commonly regarded as
highly volatile. The numerous swings of the
price curve during past decades would
appear to support this view. Yet the broad,
overall development of oil prices over the
past 30 years reveals that these oscillations
can be explained according to important
political and economic events and develop-
ments. The 1973 Yom Kippur War caused
the OPEC cartel to employ the instrument
of production limits for the first time. As a
result, the price of oil rose abruptly from
approximately $3 to $14 per barrel and
remained at this level until the end of the
1970s. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in
1979 triggered the next jump in prices. By
1980, when price levels reached $39, world
markets were overstrained. By then, con-
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servation measures and investments in oil
production outside OPEC states  policies
initiated after the first oil crisis  had
begun to take effect. In the first half of the
1980s, demand for OPEC oil declined faster
than OPEC production limits could react.
The price of oil dropped relatively steadily
through 1985, to $27. And when OPEC
abandoned its production limits in early
1986, prices plunged to $12. A period of 13
years followed during which old and new
suppliers competed for shares of an in-
creasing world demand in what had now
become a truly free market for oil. The aver-
age price of oil during this period was $17.
During the period from 1986-1999, small
increases in prices were overshadowed by
one particularly large jump. During the
build-up and actual combat of the Gulf War
in 1990-1991, oil prices briefly surpassed
the $30 mark before rapidly falling back to
$17. In March 1999, OPEC became aware
that non-OPEC states possessed insufficient
oil reserves and that OPEC-implemented
production limits could not be counter-
balanced by other states absorption of
resultant market shares. The instrument of
production limits became effective once
again. In 2000, oil prices increased to over
$30. Yet OPEC had learned from its
experience in the early 1980s that excessive
oil prices ultimately lead to a loss of power.
As a result, the cartel delineated a target
range of $22-28 for the OPEC basket price.
Since the fall of 2000, OPEC has held prices
within this margin, with the exception of
the five months between September 11,
2001 and February 2002. On two days fol-
lowing September 11, prices exceeded the
upper limit of this margin and then
collapsed due to a drastic curtailment in
demand (reduced air travel, etc.). The
following conclusions can be drawn from
the above developments:
! In 1999, OPEC in principle regained the
power to control oil prices that it had
lost in the 1980s and 1990s. In normal
times, OPECs powers of price control
are sufficient to achieve its target prices.
However, in extreme events such as the
Persian Gulf War, September 11, 2001, or
a future war against Iraq, the instrument
of production limits or increases is
insufficient to control prices.
! Short-term events such as the Persian
Gulf War of 1991 or September 11 cause
oil prices to deviate only temporarily
from their normal levels. Longer-term
events (e.g., the Iran-Iraq War) or struc-
tural changes such as OPECs effective
use of cartel power can raise oil prices to
another level.
Thus whether or not a military attack
on Iraq will lead to a sustained change in
oil prices depends on whether such an
attack can be limited in terms of both time
and space in a manner similar to the 1991
Persian Gulf War. If military action remains
limited, one can expect a significant but
short-term increase in the price of oil.
Those states seeking to protect themselves
from risk and willing to pay nearly any
price to fill up their reserve supplies of oil
will demonstrate a short-term additional
demand for oil. This effect will already
appear in a milder form when  as now  a
potential military conflict builds up over a
longer period of time. A decline in both
demand and prices will follow accordingly
as soon as the risk to oil supplies is no
longer viewed as acute.
However, if a war against Iraq were to
spread throughout the entire region and
particularly into Saudi Arabia, oil prices
would explode and thereby unleash a
powerful shock to the global economy.
Even a common effort among all remaining
oil-producing regions of the world could
not compensate for the discontinuation of
Saudi Arabian oil production. To be sure,
oil prices could scarcely rise to $100 per
barrel, as is occasionally predicted, because
too many users would be unable to pay
even a much lower price. Nevertheless, a
decline in global oil supply by the magni-
tude of the export volume of Saudi Arabia
and Iraq, together with an increase in oil
prices to $50 and upwards, would send the
global economy into a downward spiral.
The nations of East and South Asia, which
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currently import two-thirds of the oil
produced in the Persian Gulf, would be
affected first. No one, however, would
escape the drastic repercussions of such a
supply gap. Practically all developing coun-
tries would be unable to pay, and Western
industrial nations would be extremely
vulnerable due to their dependence on
foreign trade (Europe) and capital imports
(U.S.).
Oil Companies Interests in Iraq
Would a new regime in Iraq that was
legitimized by the United States bring bene-
fits to oil enterprises, particularly those
based in the U.S.? In general, probably not.
U.S. companies have not been active in Iraq
since the end of the 1980s, while French,
Chinese, Indian, Italian, and particularly
Russian firms have engaged in business
transactions or at least negotiations with
Iraq since 1991. Russian firms, however,
have suffered considerable losses  Iraq
currently owes Russia or Russian com-
panies approximately $10 billion. Large
transactions have not yet come to fruition
due to UN sanctions; nevertheless, the com-
panies involved are waiting for the oppor-
tunity to put concluded business agree-
ments into action.
In contrast to widespread assumptions, it
is hardly possible to substantiate empiri-
cally that the U.S. is using its political
power to undermine international com-
petition for the benefit of American oil
companies. As a rule, large projects are
implemented by multinational consortia.
This applies to projects in the neighboring
Caspian Sea region as well. U.S. firms are
involved in all of these projects, but they
are not consortium leaders or majority
shareholders in any of them. Rather, this
region in particular demonstrates that the
political interests of the U.S. can diverge
significantly from the interests of oil com-
panies and that Washington shows little
consideration for these companies inter-
ests. Moreover, serious turmoil would arise
within the system of multinational cor-
porations if American enterprises were to
receive inordinately preferential treatment
that violated the usual rules of the game.
This would likely cause more harm than
good to the U.S. Of course, extraordinarily
lucrative business transactions could be
conducted in an Iraq governed at least to
some extent by the rule of law, particularly
due to the favorable cost structures that
would emerge. OPEC would most likely
seek to slow down this process in an
attempt to hinder drastic alterations in
Iraqi production quotas.
Conclusions
It is indisputable that clear connections
exist between military intervention in Iraq
and global oil markets. Oil prices react sen-
sitively to signs of crisis, but the security of
oil supplies will be endangered if, and only
if, conflict cannot be confined to Iraq. An
expansion of the conflict to Saudi Arabia
would have devastating consequences for
the global economy. It is highly improbable
that the U.S. would be driven by economic
interests to intervene in Iraq. There is no
conceivable scenario in which American
enterprises, or specifically the U.S. oil
supply, would stand to benefit immeasur-
ably from regime change in Iraq. The
globalization of oil markets and the cor-
porations that run them is a process that
cannot be easily reversed. In order to ensure
the security of oil supplies at an affordable
price, it would be desirable that military
intervention  should it occur  achieve its
goal quickly and above all not have detri-
mental effects on other Persian Gulf states.
Otherwise a global economic crisis will
occur that is far more serious than any-
thing the world has witnessed since 1945.
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